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The Demand for Private Health 
Insurance in Malawi ∗
 
Donald Makoka, Ben Kaluwa and Patrick Kambewa†
University of Malawi, Chancellor College 
 
Abstract: This study investigates the determinants of 
demand for private health insurance among formal sector 
employees in Malawi, a poor country with heavy pressure 
on under-funded free government health services. The 
study is based on membership in the Medical Aid Society 
of Malawi’s (MASM), three schemes, namely: the VIP, the 
best; the Executive, the intermediate; and the Econoplan, 
the minimum. The results indicate that formal sector 
employees prefer to receive medical treatment from 
private fee-charging health facilities, where health 
insurance would be relevant. The study finds that the 
probability of enrolling in any of MASM’s schemes 
increases with income and with age for the top and 
minimum schemes. More children and good health status 
reduce the probability of enrolling into the two lower 
schemes. The results suggest the potentially important 
roles that can be played by information and interventions 
that address the affordability factor such as through 
employer contributions that take into consideration 
income and family size.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Although public health services are still free at the point of 
consumption in Malawi, the health sector faces the problems of a 
small resource envelope, and inefficient and inequitable service 
delivery. The challenge facing governments is that if services are to 
be provided for all, then not all services can be provided (WHO, 
2000).1  In Malawi, this has resulted in resource maldistribution, 
 
∗  The article is based on the first author’s MA (Economics) thesis submitted 
to the Department of Economics, University of Malawi, at which second and 
third authors are faculty members. The usual disclaimer applies. 
†  Corresponding author: Department of Economics, University of Malawi, 
Chancellor College, PO Box 280, Zomba. Fax 265 1 525021. Tel 265 8 
864579. Email: pkambewa@chanco.unima.mw   
1 In Malawi, it was noted that public finance has attempted to provide too 
broad a range of health services resulting in their being spread too thinly 
over many services (Malawi Government, 2001a). 
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geographically, between levels of facilities and service types. The 
problems faced have been in the areas of budgeting and finance 
operations, health personnel, drugs delivery, and operations. During 
the decade following democratic elections in 1994 the problems 
worsened and involved drug pilferage and demoralised health 
personnel. On the equity front, it has also been observed that the 
non-poor have been the main beneficiaries of subsidised higher-level 
services from public tertiary facilities and that all these inefficiencies 
have generally raised the “burden of disease” for the poor (Malawi 
Government, 2001a). Government services have not only become 
ineffective but the poor (and others) end up going to for-profit 
facilities and paying for drugs they would have accessed for free at 
public facilities. 
In recent years, Malawi government’s expenditure on health has 
amounted to 8.4 percent of total expenditure compared to Southern 
Africa Development Community’s (SADCs) average of 13.7 percent 
(UNDP/SADC/SAPES, 2000).  In per capita terms, government 
expenditure on health services was around US$11 between 1997 and 
2000 compared to US$21 for low-income countries (World Bank, 
2003). The physician/patient ratio is 1.1 to 100,000 and there are 1.3 
beds per 1,000 patients (Malawi Government, 2001a). The modern 
health sector comprises three types of health service providers, 
namely: the public sector, non-profit private sector, and the private-
for-profit sector. In 1998, these accounted for a total of 7 tertiary, 82 
secondary and 417 primary facilities (Malawi Government, 2001a). 
The coverage of the sector in terms of the total number of facilities is 
therefore still quite limited for a population of 12 million and this 
partly accounts for Malawi’s poor record with health indicators.2 The 
public sector, led by the Ministry of Health (MOH) accounts for 71 
percent, 50 percent and 45 percent respectively, of the facilities at 
the tertiary, secondary and primary levels. It also dominates in 
service provision, accounting for 60 percent of all formal health care 
services followed by the not-for-profit Christian Health Association 
of Malawi (CHAM), which accounts for 37 percent and the private 
for-profit accounting for 3 percent. Health services in the public 
sector are currently provided free of charge apart from maternity 
care, private wards at central and district hospitals, paying 
 
2 As at 1997 life expectancy at birth stood at 38.9 and 39.6 years for males 
and females respectively, compared to 47.3 and 50.7 years for the whole of 
the SADC region (UNDP/SADC/SAPES, 2000). In 1998, the infant 
mortality rate was 134 per 1,000 live births, compared to 54 for SADC 
(Government of Malawi, 2001a and Government of Malawi/World Bank, 
2006 p133). 
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outpatient departments and the new hospital by-pass fee (Malawi 
Government, 2001b). 
Over time and despite its dominance, state-service delivery 
failure, has been shifting the burden of access to effective health care 
to the private pocket. Estimated out-of-pocket expenditures by 
households on health services have been on the rise and involving a 
growing number and diverse range of private-for-profit players. 
From US$9.1 million in 1995 private expenses increased to US$ 37.1 
in 2000 when the share of private expenditure on health to GDP was 
4 percent compared to government’s contribution of 3.6 percent 
(Malawi Government, 2001c; World Bank, 2003). 
Against this background, health insurance can provide an 
additional source of health care financing, albeit on a self-selection 
basis. It offers a number of economy-wide or public benefits, 
including: private sector cost-sharing that relieves government of the 
burden of providing services for those willing and able to pay and 
allowing more effective targeting of public health care resources 
towards the needy, i.e. equity effects, and; further increasing  
efficiency through increased competition in health service provision. 
To the potential participants in health insurance schemes there 
would also be private benefits from improved scheme performance, 
better value for money and the relief from inconveniencing out-of-
pocket expenditures (Conn and Walford, 1998; Abel-Smith, 1992). 
But these potential benefits not withstanding, the effective demand 
for such schemes in Malawi has never been assessed. 
This paper assesses the determinants of demand for private 
health insurance among formal sector employees in Malawi. This 
entails taking into consideration: a) the extent to which formal sector 
employees prefer to receive treatment from private health facilities 
where health insurance would be relevant, b) for those with no 
insurance, whether this was because of income or lack of 
information, and c) the factors that determine an individual’s specific 
participation in three schemes offered by Malawi’s oldest and largest 
health insurance provider, Medical Aid Society of Malawi. 
 
2. The Health Insurance Industry    
 
The health insurance industry in Malawi is underdeveloped. There 
is no compulsory health insurance even for those in public formal 
sector employment. Before the establishment of OASIZ Medical Aid 
in 2003, the MASM was the only third party institution in the health 
insurance industry. Some parastatals and some firms have small 
schemes of their own which they operate themselves or contract 
MASM to administer on their behalf (Malawi Government, 2001a).  
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The MASM is a non-profit-making organization, which assists its 
members to access medical support and services through three 
schemes. The most comprehensive scheme is the VIP scheme, with a 
monthly premium of MK 1,500 and catering for treatment in any 
country in the Southern African region.  The Executive Scheme 
requires a lower monthly contribution of MK 700 per person. It 
covers payments for medical treatment up to MK 300,000 per annum 
from government, mission, and private hospitals and clinics 
registered with the Society. The last scheme, Econoplan which caters 
for low-income individuals, has a monthly premium of MK 300 for 
treatment as in the Executive Scheme but with a much lower annual 
limit of MK 50,000. Contributions to MASM are payable monthly, 
quarterly or annually.  MASM reimburses the costs of consultations, 
prescriptions and treatment at a rate dependent on the type of 
coverage chosen. 
In the period 2004-05 there were 56,269 people insured with 
MASM. However, in a country with a population of over ten million 
people, the number of those who have health insurance is still very 
insignificant. The insured involved 1,116 groups or company 
schemes and 1,957 individual or family schemes. Out of total 
expenditure of MK719 million in 2004-05, 93 percent was accounted 
for by the groups or company schemes.  The actual orientation of the 
expenditures was dominated by consultation (about 30 percent) 
followed by medicals, accounting for 28 percent (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 Health Insurance Service Expenditure 2004-05 
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3. Earlier Empirical Studies 
 
There are two major contending theories about what motivates 
people to take out insurance, including health insurance. One 
espouses the maximisation of expected utility of income when there 
is a possibility of loss that can be insured against.3 An alternative 
theory is called prospect theory and it suggests that the demand for 
health insurance is demand for income transfer from the healthy 
state, when medical care is an irrelevant good, to the ill state, when 
medical care becomes a substitute for other goods and services 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1986a and 1986b). Some observers have 
argued that the two theories have a major weakness in the sense 
that they rely on people comparing the expected gains from 
insurance over the costs of premium and costs from future prospects 
of illness if not insured (Nyman, 1998 and 2001). Regardless of the 
details about how these two perspectives matter, and there are 
sceptics. The factors that drive the decision to take out health 
insurance would likely be the same, from the demand side such as 
ability and willingness to pay, and supply side such as supplier 
barriers. 
Empirically, the United States of America’s long history with 
healthcare provision based on private health insurance provides a 
vast empirical literature on the subject of demand for health 
insurance. Of more relevance and interest here however would be 
studies based on contexts where the experiences cater for state and 
private provision of insurance and/or health care. These include 
some Western, Asian, transition East-European and African studies 
whose objectives have been as varied though insightful. These have 
ranged from seeking views about expectations from health insurance 
as a means of financing health care, whether it represents value for 
money, whether there should be equity considerations, to the role of 
possible demand-side factors (income, education, sex, marital status, 
age, health status, and dependents) and supply side factors (service 
quality, risk). 
A study on people’s views about health sector and insurance 
reforms in Croatia between 1999 and 2000 found that 31 percent 
said that access to services should reflect payment and 39 percent 
said that what they contributed in insurance corresponded to the 
service they received (Mastilica and Babic-Bosanac, 2002). A 
majority, 60 percent, expected insurance contributions to reflect 
equity considerations i.e. be progressive and increase with income.  
 
3 This theory was originated by von Nuemann and Morgenstern (1964) and 
was further elaborated by Friedman and Savage (1988). 
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Two studies have examined the demand for private health 
insurance as an alternative to government or statutory schemes in 
Taiwan and Germany. In Taiwan, the key findings were that income 
and education had a positive impact on the demand for private 
insurance, whether the respondent was a married female and 
working in a state-run enterprise (Liu and Chen, 2002). The German 
study finds that the alternative voluntary health scheme attracted a 
minority who had incomes above a minimum threshold and that the 
marginal benefits did not outweigh the costs in terms of choice of 
service provider or services provided. Furthermore, voluntary health 
schemes penalised those with dependents, the elderly and those in 
poor health (Thomson et al, 2002). In the Catalonia region of Spain a 
study identified a quality gap between public and private health 
insurance as a key determinant of the rising demand for private 
health insurance and attendant health services (Costa and Garcia, 
1999).  
A study on the strengths and limitations of rural community-
based health insurance schemes in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania 
found that despite the great need for decentralised and effective 
health care at this level, financing through insurance faced the 
problems of limited household resources which placed enormous 
strain on scheme design and implementation (Musau, 1999). 
 
4. Methodology and Data 
 
The study is based on primary data collected in two urban centres of 
southern Malawi of Blantyre and Zomba4 between March and April 
2003. A structured questionnaire was used to gather information 
from formal sector employees. 221 respondents were randomly 
selected, 42 percent of whom were female. Data collected included: 
respondents’ socio-economic characteristics, individual’s self 
assessment of health status, health care utilisation, their attitudes 
towards private health insurance and their status regarding their 
holding private health insurance with MASM.  
In the study, demand for MASM health insurance is analysed 
using a logistic regression model due to the categorical nature of the 
response variable. In particular, a multinomial logit model (MNLM) 
is employed by deriving the MNLM as a probability mode (Long, 
1997). Let y be the dependent variable, demand for health insurance, 
with J nominal outcomes or types of schemes. Although the 
categories are numbered 1 to J, they are not assumed to be ordered. 
This assumption is based on the following argument: even though 
 
4 Blantyre and Zomba are respectively the second largest and fourth largest 
urban centres in Malawi. 
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the schemes have a nominal preference ordering from VIP down to 
Econoplan and No Scheme, they are means-bound in which case the 
means or affordability operates as weighting factors. The study 
adopts the multinomial logit model as presented in equation 3 in the 
Appendix. 
The present study builds on several earlier studies. Of particular 
interest is a study undertaken in Denmark (Christiansen et al, 
2002). However, the nature of the present study is organised with 
due consideration to the specific features of the health insurance 
industry in Malawi and the availability of data. Demand for private 
health insurance should be understood as a predictor of enrolment 
for membership with MASM, depending on a number of explanatory 
variables. Based on the models by Long (1997) and Christiansen et 
al. (2002), Table 2 provides a list of variables that are expected to 
influence demand along with their expected signs.  
 
Table 2 Description of Independent Variables 
Variable Description Expected 
Sign 
Gender  Sex of the individual + 
Age  Age of the individual + 
AgeSquared  Age of the individual squared - 
Schoolyears Length of schooling for the individual + 
Children  Number of children the individual has + 
HealthStatus1  Excellent self reported health status of 
the individual 
+ 
HealthStatus2 Fair self reported health status of the 
individual 
 
+ 
HealthStatus3 Poor self reported health status of the 
individual 
 
- 
Income Total monthly income + 
Response Variable (Membership into MASM) 
 Group 1 = VIP Scheme 
 Group 2 = Executive Scheme 
 Group 3 = Econoplan 
 Group 4 = Not member 
 
It is expected that the probability of a person to be insured is 
likely to increase with age because of an increased need for health 
care. However, the share of the insured above the age of 55 is 
expected to decrease with increasing age because of the age 
limitation in MASM and therefore the age-squared variable is 
expected to have a negative sign. To see how this effect materialises, 
one needs to relate the decision to take out health insurance to an 
investment where one needs to calculate the discounted net benefits 
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over the period of investment, which in this case might be smaller 
the closer one is  to the age limit. 
Length of schooling was used as a proxy for general knowledge of 
the benefits of being healthy at least cost, and expected to affect the 
attitude towards health insurance positively. Self-assessed health 
status was included in the study with three categories, excellent, fair 
and poor. Owing to enrolment criteria at MASM, members are 
expected to be in good health with poor health being negatively 
associated with barriers from the supply-side but observable as low 
demand. Both excellent and fair health statuses ere expected to 
positively affect the probability of a person to be insured. 
Since MASM registers children as dependents, it gives an 
incentive for families with children to enrol. The study therefore 
expects the probability of being insured to increase with the number 
of children. Furthermore, based on earlier studies that have shown 
that the distribution of health insurance premiums is progressive 
with respect to income, the present study expects the probability of 
being insured to increase with an individual’s total income. The 
theory of demand for health care stipulates that female individuals 
demand more health care than their male counterparts. As a result, 
the study expects gender to positively influence the probability of 
having health insurance.   
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
In order to test the hypotheses on the choice of health facility, which 
makes health insurance relevant or irrelevant, and on the reasons 
for not having insurance, a binomial test was used. The test 
compares the observed frequencies of the two categories of a 
dichotomous variable to the frequencies expected under a binomial 
distribution with a specified probability parameter, which in this 
case was assumed to be 0.5, representing a 50/50 outcome. 
 
Table 1 Binomial Tests on Choice of Health Facility and on Reasons 
for not Having Insurance 
Test Category Observed 
Proportion 
Test 
Proportion 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2 Tailed) a
Paying 0.98 On Choice of 
Health Facility Non-paying 0.02 
 
0.5 
 
0.000*** 
Lack of 
knowledge 
0.68 On Reasons for 
not Having 
Insurance Lack of 
income 
0.32 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
0.004*** 
Note: a Based on Z approximation 
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In order to run the binomial test on the choice of a health 
facility, we have restricted our choice of health facility to two, paying 
and non-paying. The results show that the observed asymptotic 
significance level based on Z approximation is very high. We 
therefore reject the hypothesis that the proportion of each category is 
equal (0.5), at 1 percent level of significance and conclude that the 
proportions of the two categories are statistically different at 1 
percent level. As many as 98 percent of the respondents preferred 
paying health services which are private health facilities where 
health insurance is relevant. 
The results of the binomial test on the reasons for not having 
insurance indicate that the proportions for lack of knowledge and 
lack of income are also statistically different, at 1 percent level of 
significance. The results show that the majority, 68 percent, of the 
respondents with no insurance cited lack of knowledge as the reason 
rather than low income, implying that information and marketing 
would be a crucial part in extending the outreach of the health 
insurance initiative.  
Table 3 presents results of the multinomial logit regression 
showing variables which were important for determining demand for 
the various schemes. The importance of each of the variables in the 
multinomial system was tested, i.e. whether all the variables have a 
significant effect on choosing a particular type of scheme, against the 
baseline choice (no insurance scheme). The results show that at 1 
percent level of significance all the nine variables have a significant 
joint impact on the probability of choosing each of the three schemes. 
 
Table 3 Factors Affecting Demand for Various Insurance Scheme  
VIP Scheme Executive Scheme Econoplan Scheme Variable 
β P>z β P>z β P>z 
Gender -1.041 0.107 -0.0732 0.865 -0.4489 0.865 
Age 1.317 0.030** 0.4089 0.233 0.6722 0.233* 
AgeSquared -0.018 0.024** -0.0055 0.218 -0.0089 0.218* 
Children -0.0.52 0.871 -0.3849 0.057* -0.6312 0.057* 
Income 0.0004 0.000*** 0.00038 0.000*** 0.00032 0.000*** 
Schoolyears -0.385 0.013** -0.1083 0.353 -0.0617 0.353 
HealthStatus1 -13.818 0.219 -14.8050 0.020** -14.9894 0.020** 
HealthStatus2 -13.170 0.237 -14.9755 0.018** -15.7949 0.018** 
Note: Hstatus3 was dropped to avoid the problem of matrix singularity. *    
denotes significance at 10 percent level, ** denotes significance at 5 
percent level, *** denotes significance at 1 percent level 
 
Next we tested whether the direct impact of monthly income has 
the same impact on an individual’s choice of a particular scheme as 
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it does for another scheme. The results indicate that the impact of 
total monthly income on an individual’s choice of the VIP Scheme 
and the Executive Scheme was not equal, at 1 percent level of 
significance. At the same significance level of 1 percent, we also 
reject the hypothesis that the impact of total monthly income on the 
VIP and the Econoplan Scheme is equal. However, for the Executive 
and the Econoplan Schemes, the null hypothesis can only be rejected 
at 10 percent level of significance. 
The results in Table 3 show that under the VIP Scheme, Age, 
AgeSquared, and Income were significant with the expected signs at 
the 5 percent or 1 percent levels. Schoolyears is significant at 5 
percent level with a negative sign, contrary to expectations. Thus, 
age positively influences the probability of VIP scheme membership 
up to 55 years and becomes a negative influence thereafter, while 
income also has a positive influence on this more expensive but 
better scheme. Schoolyears was used in the study as a proxy for the 
general knowledge of the benefits of being healthy.  But there is a 
strong possibility in Malawi that for the VIP scheme this variable 
could be picking up other effects, such as job category, income and 
insurance entitlements by type of employer (private sector versus 
public sector), where the prospects for insurance would be better for 
private even with less schooling.  In the sample, 38 percent of the 
respondents had post-secondary education.  
For the Executive Scheme, only Income was significant with the 
expected sign at 1 percent level. Children is significant at 10 percent 
level with a negative sign while HealthStatus1 and HealthStatus2 
are also significant at 5 percent level and with a negative sign. Age, 
AgeSquared, and Schoolyears which are important variables in 
explaining the probability of having a VIP Scheme, did not influence 
an individual’s probability of having an Executive Scheme. These 
findings show that respondents demanding the Executive Scheme 
tended to be influenced positively by their income levels, negatively 
by household size which restricts ability and /or willingness to pay, 
and also negatively by whether they were in excellent or fair health. 
Compared to the demand for the VIP Scheme, these findings give 
Executive scheme the hallmark of a necessity. This would still be out 
of reach for those with more children who might have greater need 
for an intermediate scheme to moderate premium payments and out-
of-pocket expenses. 
The results suggest that there is a potential moral hazard 
problem in people demanding the Executive Scheme, whereby 
respondents would like to enrol when they suspect they will need 
health services.  Where they self assess to be fit or fairly fit, then 
they are not likely to enrol for the Executive Scheme. In case of 
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unexpected illness, these would be likely candidates for government 
health facilities.  
The demand for the Econoplan shares the same characteristics 
as that for the Executive scheme except that this time both Age and 
AgeSquared were significant at 10 percent level and they had the 
expected sign. Below the age restrictions, age is a motivating factor 
for this cheaper or minimum scheme. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Results from the statistical analysis have revealed that, at demand 
for health service level, formal sector employees prefer to receive 
treatment from private health facilities where health insurance 
would be relevant and important. Although some formal sector 
employees do not possess an insurance scheme with MASM due to 
financial constraints, the major reason why most employees do not 
have a scheme with MASM is lack of knowledge. If formal sector 
employees became more knowledgeable on health insurance 
procedures in general, and the operation of MASM in particular, the 
numbers of people with private health insurance among these 
employees would increase. Information is therefore an important 
factor in increasing outreach. 
Although different variables influence the probability of having 
different schemes differently, the study establishes income as the 
common most significant factor that positively affects an individual’s 
probability of having any of the three types of schemes with MASM. 
This implies that the affordability factor imposes a constraint on 
demand for health insurance. The success of the introduction of 
social health insurance for those in formal public sector employment 
would need to take into account this income or affordability factor, 
possibly through a suitable approach to its design like employer 
contributions. 
The age of the individual increases the probability of a person 
enrolling in the VIP and Econoplan schemes because of the potential 
need for health care. However, the age squared variable negatively 
affects the probability of enrolment, such that the probability of 
enrolling decreases with increasing age because of the age limitation. 
Therefore, in the decisions regarding health insurance, government 
implementation of social health insurance would likely benefit older 
employees more than younger ones. For the intermediate, Executive 
scheme and the minimum Econoplan, which would likely be 
attractive for the lower-income, the probability of being insured 
decreases with the number of children, suggesting problems with 
effective demand. This has adverse welfare implications in the case 
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of poor service at government facilities because of the burden of out-
of-pocket expenses at paying facilities.  
Again with reference to the two lower level schemes, good self-
reported health status reduces the probability of having a scheme 
with MASM because it reduces the incentive to enrol in the schemes. 
Since poor health is a ground for barred entry, good health now 
probably also reduces the perceived discounted net benefits and/or 
raises faith in the free services at government facilities. Overall, the 
results of this study suggest that health insurance would become 
attractive with more information and in the event of further declines 
in the performance of the free public health system or if these 
services also become user-charged. Presently, those marginalized 
appear to be those likely to need the schemes most i.e. those with 
lower incomes and those with larger families, and especially 
including young children. As an anti-poverty measure in the face of 
resource constraints, the government has the choice of improving its 
own service delivery, which will reduce the incentive for insurance 
by those able to pay, and introducing statutory insurance schemes, 
like the German one, starting with its own employees. 
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Appendix 
Technical Note on the Multinomial Logit Model 
 
Let  be the probability of observing a particular outcome 
m given x, a vector of independent variables. The probability model 
for y can now be constructed as follows: 
( xmypr |=
 Assume that ( )xmypr |=  is a function of the linear 
combination mxβ . The vector includes 
the intercept 
( )′= Kmkmomm ββββ ......
m0β and coefficients kmβ for the effect of  on 
outcome  
kx
m
 To ensure that the probabilities are nonnegative, we take the 
exponential of ( )mm xx ββ exp: . Although the result is 
nonnegative, the sum  does not equal 1, which it 
must for probabilities. 
(∑
=
J
j
jx
1
exp β )
) The third step, therefore, involves restrictions to make the probabilities sum to 1. We thus divide ( mxβexp  by 
: ( )∑
=
J
j
jx
1
exp β
 
( )ii xmypr |= = ( )( )∑
=
J
j
ji
mi
x
x
1
exp
exp
β
β       …………………………         
 (1) 
        This normalization ensures that  ( ) 1|
1
==∑
=
J
m
xmypr
 
 However, the model is unidentified since more than one set of 
parameters generates the same probabilities of the observed. 
By multiplying expression 1 by ( )( )ξ
ξ
x
x
exp
exp  it can be shown that 
the model is not identified. Since the operation is the same as 
multiplying by 1, the value of the probability remains the 
same: 
 
 ( )ii xmypr |= ( )( )
( )
( )ξ
ξ
β
β
i
i
J
j
ji
mi
x
x
x
x
exp
exp
exp
exp
1
×=
∑
=
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( )
( )
[ ]( )
[ ]( ) )2(........................................exp
exp
exp
exp
1
1
∑
∑
=
=
+
+=
+
+=
J
j
ji
mi
J
j
iji
imi
x
x
xx
xx
ξβ
ξβ
ξβ
ξβ
 
 
 Although the values of the probabilities have not changed, the 
original parameters mβ  have been replaced by ξβ +m . Thus, 
for every 0≠ξ  there is a different set of parameters that 
results in the same predictions. Clearly, the model is not 
identified. 
 
 In order to make the model identified, restrictions are 
imposed on the s'β , such that for any nonzero ξ the 
constraints are violated. This is achieved by constraining one 
of the s'β  to equal 0, such as ,01 =β  or ,02 =β or .0=Jβ  
The choice is arbitrary. In the study we set .0=Jβ  Clearly, if 
a nonzero ξ is added to ,Jβ  the assumption that 0=Jβ  is 
violated. 
 
 Adding this constraint to the model results in the probability 
equation given as: 
( )ii xmypr |= = ( )( )∑
=
J
j
ji
mi
x
x
1
exp
exp
β
β          where .0=Jβ     (3) 
( ) ( )( ) ).....(4 ...............      0β e      wher          exp
exp| 44
1
===
∑
=j
ji
mi
ii
x
xxmy
β
βpr
 
which is used in the study, where:  
xi = the vector of covariates for respondent i 
βm = the coefficient vector for choice of membership into MASM 
J = the number of choices. 
 
